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The Greens in the German Federal Elections of 2013
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The German Greens had a disappointing election outcome on 22 September 2013. Its 
8.4% of the vote, well below its record 10.7% in 2009, left the party shocked and 
dispirited.  
 
Campaign Preparations: Leadership and Programme 
The Greens entered the election year in fairly confident mood. Support for the party 
peaked well above 20% shortly after the Fukushima nuclear accident in March 2011.2  
This was followed by a strong run of record results in state elections, which saw the 
Greens represented in all 16 regional parliaments for the first time and in several 
regional coalition governments. 
 
In late 2012, Green party members for the first time directly HOHFWHGWKHSDUW\¶VWZR
µOHDGFDQGLGDWHV¶-UJHQ7ULWWLQIRUPHU(QYLURQPHQW0LQLVWHUDQG.DWULQ*|ULQJ-
Eckardt, an East German who held a high office in the Evangelical Church. While 
Trittin represented the left-wing of the party, Göring-(FNDUGW¶VVXUSULVHHOHFWLRQZDV
interpreted as a strong sign that the membership also wanted to have more 
conservative views represented.  
 
The election programme passed by a party conference in April 2013 was, however, 
widely regarded as a move to the left. A substantial document, the book version 
running to 336 pages, it contained a wide range of very detailed policies, including 
more emphasis on social justice and proposing a wide range of tax increases. The 
programme reflected the ideological changes since the end of the red-green coalition 
in 2005. The economic policies of that government, in particular the Hartz IV 
reforms, were seen by many Greens as a mistake because they had contributed to the 
creation of a large low-paid VHFWRURIµSUHFDULRXV¶HPSOR\PHQWDQGLQFUHDVLQJ
inequality. 
 
Media commentators noted the boldness of a party going into an election campaign 
with a programme imposing a major financial burden on its own well-heeled 
supporters.  However, the poll rating of the Greens - which had stabilised around 13-
14% throughout 2012 and early 2013 - appeared unaffected.  
 
Regarding future government partners, the party expressed a strong preference for a 
µUHG-JUHHQ¶FRDOLWLRQZLWKWKH6RFLDO'HPRFUDWLF3DUW\63', although by spring 
2013, with the SPD polling poorly, this outcome already appeared unlikely. 
Consequently, the only realistic alternative ZDVDµEODFN-JUHHQ¶FRDOLWLRQZLWKWKH
Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social 
Union (CSU).  However, two coalitions with the CDU at state level had ended 
prematurely in the late 2000s. With most green voters placing themselves on the left, 
DVWUDWHJ\RINHHSLQJWKHSRVVLELOLW\RIDµEODFN-JUHHQ¶FRDOLWLRQRSHQULVNHGDOLHQDWLQJ
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Green voters who might not want to vote Green in order to prop up a new Merkel 
government.  
 
The Election Campaign 
Without a realistic prospect of entering government, the Greens found it difficult to 
mobilise their supporters. Nevertheless, the SDUW\¶V support remained buoyant: in early 
August, polls still indicated a Green vote share of  12 to14%. 
 
This situation changed dramatically in the last few weeks of the campaign. On 5 
August 2013, the popular daily paper, BILD, ran an article claiming that the Greens 
wanted to ban the consumption of meat. The green programme contained a passage 
suggesting the introduction of one meat-free day a week in canteens and staff 
restaurants. This µVeggie Day¶was attacked vigorously by the government parties. 
The Greens were accused of being a Verbotspartei, a party of prohibitions. The 
µVeggie Day¶ as a symbol of Green LQWHUIHUHQFHLQSHRSOH¶VGDLO\OLYHs had enormous 
resonance and immediately became a core feature of the media narrative of the Green 
campaign.   
 
The tax debate also became more prominent as the media discussed details of the 
*UHHQV¶UHIRUPSURSRVDOV,QWKHWD[SURSRVDOVKDGEHHQIUamed as part of a 
µJUHHQQHZGHDO¶with investment in green jobs seen as the best way out of the 
economic crisis. This link to environmental and energy problems was largely absent 
from the SDUW\¶Veconomic discourse in 2013.  
 
The Green election campaign was also affected by an issue that nobody had 
anticipated: the influence of paedophile groups in the early history of the Green Party. 
The story initially focused on the Greens¶ leader in the European Parliament, Daniel 
Cohn-Bendit who in a 1975 book had made statements that were interpreted as 
allusions to sexual acts involving him and young children, which he later claimed 
were purely fictional. He had been attacked on this issue several times before but had 
survived politically largely unscathed. In March 2013, the issue re-emerged when 
Cohn-Bendit was nominated for a prestigious German prize in recognition of his 
social and political engagement. Against the background of recent child sex scandals 
in Germany, involving a leading boarding school and the Catholic Church, journalists 
pursued the story vigorously. Media coverage quickly extended to the positions taken 
by the Greens on these issues in the early 1980s, with claims that paedophile groups 
had played an important role in the party. With more and more stories emerging, the 
Greens decided in May 2013 to ask an independent academic, University of Göttingen 
Professor Franz Walter, to conduct a thorough investigation into the activities of 
paedophile groups in the Greens.  
 
Walter¶V preliminary findings (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 12 August 2013) 
were that the influence of paedophile groups in the 1980s had been far more 
widespread than previously acknowledged. The 1980 fundamental programme of the 
Greens (the main expression of Green values and demands until the 1993 merger 
EHWZHHQWKH*UHHQVDQG$OOLDQFH¶FRQWDLQed a passage demanding legalisation of 
ZKDWSDHGRSKLOHVFODLPHGWREHµFRQVHQVXDO¶VH[EHWZHHQFKLOGUHQDQGDGXOWV
couched in legalistic language as a demand for the amendment of the relevant 
paragraph of the German penal code. Only in 1989 did the Green Party 
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comprehensively distance itself from paedophile groups whose demands had 
subsequently been unrepresented in Green programmes.   
 
:DOWHU¶VUHSRUWFDXVHGDZDYH of media coverage highly critical of the Greens. A few 
days before election day Walter published a further newspaper article that linked 
Trittin directly to the paedophilia issue: his name appeared, together with those of 
VHYHUDORWKHUVDVµUHVSRQVLEOHLQWHUPVRIWKH*HUPDQSUHVVODZ¶DOHJDOUHTXLUHPHQW
for all German publications) on a 1981 Green local election programme in Göttingen 
(where Trittin was studying at the time), which contained a demand for the 
OHJDOLVDWLRQRIµFRQVHQVXDO¶VH[EHWZHHQFKLldren and adults (Die Tageszeitung, 16 
September 2013).  
 
By then, the Greens had been dropping roughly one percentage point a week in the 
final month of the campaign to enter the election on 9%.  
 
The Result 
On election night, the Greens appeared stunned by their poor result (see Table 1). Yet 
set in the context of their historical development, perhaps that was an overreaction: 
wLWKRIµVHFRQG¶YRWHVWKH*UHHQVDFKLHYHGWKHir third best result. By 
comparison, the FDP achieved its worst ever result, and the SPD its second worst 
post-war result. The Pirate Party, which had made substantial gains in regional 
elections during 2011 and 2012, fell well short of the 5% threshold. Of the three small 
parties represented in the Bundestag that had made substantial gains in 2009, the 
Greens lost fewest votes and seats.  
  
--- Table 1 about here --- 
 
Clearly, the 2013 result was a set-back, the Greens receiving almost one million fewer 
votes than in 2009. Despite that, their position in parliament could arguably be seen as 
stronger than in 2009.  With the FDP failing to return to parliament, Chancellor 
0HUNHOQHHGHGDQHZFRDOLWLRQSDUWQHU)RUWKHILUVWWLPHDµEODFN-JUHHQ¶FRDOLWLRQRI
CDU/CSU and Greens had a majority and constituted one possible way for the Greens 
to enter government. The CDU and CSU invited the Greens to preliminary talks about 
DSRVVLEOHµEODFN-JUHHQ¶FRDOLWLRQ$IWHUWZRPHHWLQJVWKH*UHHQVGHFLGHGWKHUHZDV
no basis for formal coalition negotiations, but both sides commented favourably on 
WKHWDONVKROGLQJRXWWKHSURPLVHRIµEODFN-JUHHQ¶FRDOLWLRQVLQIXWXUH 
 
As the SPD had categorically excluded the possibility of entering a coalition with the 
Left party, the second possibility ± DµUHG-red-JUHHQ¶FRDOLWLRQwith the SPD and the 
Left Party ± was never a realistic option.  
 
 
Analysis 
What went wrong for the Greens? The party leadership responded to the disappointing 
result very quickly. Claudia Roth, Renate Künast and Trittin resigned their respective 
positions as co-chair of the party and co-chairs of the parliamentary party, introducing 
a generational change in the leadership. But few blamed the result mainly on the 
leadership. Three issues dominated the immediate post-election discussions at the 
Länderrat (party state council) and full party congress: the paedophilia issue, the 
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Veggie Day and the tax-raising programme. Which was most responsible for the 
green failure at the ballot box?   
 
The timing of the decline in the polls suggests that the paedophilia issue hit the 
Greens particularly hard. After a brief hesitation, the party had decided to pursue a 
policy of complete openness, which some thought came too late.  However, in the 
context of an election campaign, the release of historical research results about events 
of the 1980s created a nightmare scenario for the party. In the public mind, this was 
not just an academic discourse about some detail of Green Party history but associated 
Greens with the idea of legalising sexual practises involving children that are 
universally condemned as heinous and despicable.  
 
2QHEHQHILWRIWKHUHWLUHPHQWRIµYHWHUDQ¶*UHHQOHDGHUVPLJKWEHWKDWWKHSDUW\FRXOG
now be in a better position to face the accusations about the influence of paedophile 
groups in the 1980s and achieve a degree of closure. As one of the younger speakers 
at the Länderrat UHPDUNHGKHZDVKDSS\WRKDYHEHHQJUDQWHGWKHµPHUF\RIODWH
ELUWK¶LQWHUPVRIEHLQJWRR\RXQJWRKDYHEHHQDFWLYHLQWKH*UHHQVLQWKHV
Further research may produce more unpleasant news but if the Greens can 
successfully claim to have kept these groups and their demands out of the party for 
more than 20 years, with none of the new leadership team having been involved in a 
senior capacity in the party before 1993, the party should be more successful in 
avoiding association with these issues. 
 
More crucial for the future policy direction of the party were debates about the Veggie 
Day and the tax programme. In the minds of Green campaigners, the Veggie Day 
loomed very large and was seen as a turning point in the election campaign. Greens 
found it difficult to extricate themselves from the charge of being a Verbotspartei, a 
state-centred, illiberal party of Besserwisser (know-it-alls) trying to force their views 
on an unwilling population. Across the party, this was seen as a major challenge that 
needed to be addressed. Party co-chair, Cem Özdemir, demanded the Greens should 
DJDLQEHFRPHDµSDUW\RIIUHHGRP¶ 
 
Even more important in the post-election discussion was tax policy. Were voters 
deterred from voting Green EHFDXVHWKHSDUW\¶VWD[SROLFLHVZRXOGKLWWKHLUHFRQRPLF
SRVLWLRQSDUWLFXODUO\KDUG"$FFRUGLQJWRDVWXG\RIWKHLPSDFWRIWKHSDUWLHV¶WD[
proposals on their own voters, the Greens¶ programme punished their own supporters 
very harshly whilHPRVWRWKHUSDUWLHV¶WD[SROLFLHVZHUHGHVLJQHGWREHQHILWWKHLURZQ
voters (Peichl et al. 2013). A move of affluent Greens away from the party for reasons 
of personal economic gain would be consistent with a trend in German public 
attitudes in recent years, which Wilhelm Heitmeyer (2010) KDVWHUPHGµGH-
VROLGDULVDWLRQ¶. Heitmeyer¶V annual surveys show that neo-liberal thinking on social 
justice and the welfare state had an increasing impact on Germany during the 2000s, 
affluent Germans increasingly blaming the poor for their own predicament and 
regarding them as less worthy of state support.  If this trend also affects affluent 
(potential) Green voters, it is bad news for the electoral appeal of a Green Party 
promoting social and economic policies directed at redistribution and greater social 
justice. Those sections of the population who would benefit most from Green tax 
policies are most likely to vote for the Left party or not at all, since non-voting is 
closely linked with economic deprivation, and the negative effect of low social class 
on turnout at elections appears to become stronger over time (Petersen et al. 2013).  
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A rival explanation for the unpopularity of the Green tax-raising proposals focuses on 
the core competence of the party. Asked which party has the highest competence in 
dealing with specific policies, the Greens in 2013, with 35%, were seen as the most 
competent party on energy policy.  But the most competent party on social justice was 
the SPD, also with 35%, while the Greens did not feature at all (Forschungsgruppe 
Wahlen 2013, p. 33). A voter choosing between voting Green or SPD who is mainly 
motivated by social justice issues could thus be expected to have voted for the SPD,  
SDUWLFXODUO\DVDµUHG-JUHHQ¶JRYHUQPHQWZDVXQOLNHO\, and as supporting the SPD 
might strengthen its position in a µJUDQGFRDOLWLRQ¶Analysis of voter movements by 
Infratest dimap showed that the Greens suffered a net loss of 550,000 voters to the 
SPD and 450,000 to the CDU/CSU (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 24 September 
2013). 
 
Beyond these issues, the major focus of the internal party debate concerned the lack of 
any realistic prospect of Greens entering government.  After three failed campaigns to 
secure DµUHG-JUHHQ¶JRYHUQPHQWWKere is consensus in the party that such an exclusive 
strategy should be discontinued.  The October party congress passed a motion calling 
for a wider set of RSWLRQVIRUIXWXUHFRDOLWLRQIRUPDWLRQZLWKERWKµEODFN-JUHHQ¶and 
µUHG-red-JUHHQ¶FRDOLWLRQVPHQWLRQHG+RZHYHULWLVGLIILFXOWWRLPDJLQHWKDWWKHSDUW\
could enter future federal elections without an expressed preference for a coalition 
partner. The coalition question also risks reviving factional divisions within the party, 
WKH5HDORVIDYRXULQJDPRYHWRµEODFN-JUHHQ¶ZKLOHWKH/HIWSUHIHUVµUHG-red-JUHHQ¶ 
 
Nevertheless, the party is committed to avoiding open conflict between the two 
factions, as demonstrated by the smooth change of leadership after the elections. Yet 
factional allegiance continues to play a major role for political careers in the party: 
Simone Peter, the new party co-chair, and Anton Hofreiter, the new parliamentary co-
OHDGHUERWKDVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKH/HIWIDFWLRQµHPHUJHG¶IURPUHODWLYHREVFurity to 
become undisputed candidates for these positions.  
 
 
Conclusion 
Once the disappointment of the 2013 result has receded, a closer look at the current 
position of the party will reveal substantial strengths. The party survived an extremely 
difficult election campaign and knows it can rely on around 3.7 million voters come 
what may. Given the demographic development, which will see the generations most 
influenced by green thinking increase in size in coming years (Rüdig 2012), the 
fundamentals are in place for further growth. Assuming that the Greens spend the next 
IRXU\HDUVLQRSSRVLWLRQWRDµJUDQGFRDOLWLRQ¶WKHSDUW\ZLOOSOD\DQLPSRUWDQWUROHDV
one of two opposition parties of virtually identical size to counter a government with 
an overwhelming majority. Moreover, because the grand coalition does not command 
a majority of votes in the Bundesrat, the upper chamber of parliament, the Greens (as 
coalition partner in six regional governments) are in a fairly strong position to 
influence important federal legislation. 
 
SPDOOSDUWLHVKDYHDOZD\VEHQHILWWHGHOHFWRUDOO\IURPµJUDQGFRDOLWLRQV¶$QLPSURYHG
result in 2017 may thus be expected, although the salience of the Green core 
environmental and energy issues will also play a role. Key choices in the next four 
year will likely to be made in the Länder: the chances fRUDµEODFN-JUHHQ¶coalition at 
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federal level would be greatly enhanced if such governments could successfully be 
formed at regional level. A first regional µUHG-red-JUHHQ¶FRDOLWLRQLQ:est Germany 
would send a strong signal that the Left party could finally be accepted as a potential 
coalition partner at federal level. Thus, despite the disappointment of 2013, there are 
strong indications that the future might still be bright for the Greens in Germany but 
in which political direction this will take the party is far more difficult to predict.  
 .  
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Table 1: Result of the German Federal Elections of 22 September 2013 
 
 
Party Share of the 
(Second) 
Vote (%) 
Difference 
from 2009 
Seats Difference 
from 2009 
CDU/CSU 41.5 + 7.7 311 + 72 
SPD 25.7 + 2.7 193 + 47 
The Left 8.6 - 3.3 64 - 12 
Greens 8.4 - 2.3 63 - 5 
     
FDP 4.8 - 9.8 0 - 93 
AFD 4.7 + 4.7 0 - 
Pirates 2.2 + 0.2 0 - 
 
Source: Federal Returning Officer, http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de  
 
 
German Parties: 
 
CDU  Christlich-Demokratische Union (Christian-Democratic Union) 
CSU  Christlich-Soziale Union (Christian-Social Union) 
SPD Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of 
Germany) 
The Left Die Linke (The Left) 
Greens  %QGQLVµ'LH*UQHQ$OOLDQFHµ7KH*UHHQV 
FDP  Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party) 
AFD  Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany) 
Pirates  Piratenpartei Deutschlands (Pirate Party of Germany) 
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